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A B S T R A C T
 his study fathoms the question what 
     Eurasianist discourse in Russia and 
     Kazakhstan reveals about contempo-
rary hierarchy dynamics between Russia 
and Central Asia.
To grasp these dynamics, the study re-
lies on an English School theoretical frame-
work. It links Filippo Costa Buranelli’s “nego-
tiated hegemony” concept with the gemein-
schaft-gesellschaft distinction introduced to 
the English School by Barry Buzan. While 
the former provides an analytical framework 
for contemporary spheres of influence argu-
ing that great powers are in need of the ap-
proval of the sovereign states they seek to 
influence, the latter opens up room for differ-
ent approaches to (regional) international 
society. Whereas gemeinschaft is used to 
denote an understanding of society as a 
civilizational entity based on a shared cul-
ture and with common norms and values, 
gesellschaft-type societies are understood 
as a product of pragmatic and functional in-
teraction. This study argues that the degree 
of hierarchy in a regional international soci-
ety and the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft dis-
T
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tinction constitute two interrelated dimen-
sions. More generally speaking, the analysis 
suggests that the type of society preferred or 
promoted by an actor is interrelated with this 
actor’s stance within a hierarchical relation-
ship. Following this reasoning, a(n aspira-
tional) hegemon will promote a gemein-
schaft-type society because this civilization-
al ideal offers a greater leverage to generate 
legitimacy as well as to wield influence over 
other actors of the society.
The Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist dis-
course offers an instructive example of 
these dynamics. Both countries’ foreign pol-
icy rhetoric formulates different visions of an 
Eurasianist society that are insightful in un-
derstanding their relative positioning to-
wards each other. It is suggested that Rus-
sia’s invocation of a civilizational gemein-
schaft-type society built on a common cul-
ture and identity serves to legitimize its he-
gemonic claims towards Central Asia. The 
functional gesellschaft vision which Kazakh-
stan conveys through its pragmatic Eur-
asianist rhetoric constitutes in turn a resis-
tance to these hegemonic claims by high-
lighting sovereign equality and invoking 
counter-hegemonic narratives.
KEYWORDS: English School, Negotiated Hegemony, Gemeinschaft, 
Gesellschaft, Eurasianism, Central Asia, Russia.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Recognizing the surge of Eurasianist rhetoric in the post-Soviet space, this essay seeks to fath-
om the question: What does the Eurasianist discourse in Russia and Kazakhstan reveal about 
contemporary hierarchy dynamics between Russia and Central Asia?
It suggests that the Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist discourse must be seen in the light of a “negoti-
ated hegemony” where Russia’s invocation of a civilizational gemeinschaft-type society serves to 
legitimize its hegemonic claims, while Kazakhstan’s functional gesellschaft vision of the Eurasian 
space constitutes an opposing response to these claims.
Examining Eurasianist foreign policy rhetoric is instructive as the invocation of Eurasianist nar-
ratives necessarily conveys a subjective picture of the Eurasian space. As Roland Bleiker puts it: “the 
difference between represented and representation is the very location of politics.”1 In this light, Eur-
asianist rhetoric is understood as a discursive framework that allows actors to express their visions and 
expectations of their Eurasian environment. The examination of the representation—in this case the 
countries’ respective Eurasianist vision—is thus of utmost relevance to understand underlying political 
reasoning. Therefore, only the external, foreign policy dimension of the Eurasianist discourse will be 
looked at; acknowledging that Eurasianist rhetoric also has far-reaching domestic effects.2
To answer the research question, this essay refers to an English School (ES) theoretical frame-
work. The ES is instructive as its recent regional turn has generated apt analytical tools to examine 
dynamics on the sub-global level.3 Moreover, the ES has developed a vivid debate on hierarchy and 
1 R. Bleiker, “The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 5, 
No. 3, 2001, p. 512.
2 Cf. P. Pryce, “Putin’s Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?” Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 13, 
No. 1, 2013; M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, Washington, 2008.
3 See: Y.A. Stivachtis, “Shifting Gears: From Global to Regional. The English School and the Study of Sub-Global 
International Societies,” in: System, Society and the World: Exploring the English School of International Relations, ed. by 
R.W. Murray, E-International Relations, Bristol, 2015, pp. 68-86.
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influence that informed earlier studies on the relationship between Russia and Central Asia, under-
stood here as the five Republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tajiki-
stan.4
Russia and Kazakhstan constitute suitable objects for analysis because both countries’ govern-
ments have adopted distinct Eurasianist narratives in their foreign policy rhetoric. Given the unique 
character of each country’s Eurasianism, this study cannot claim to formulate strict general conclu-
sions for the whole of Central Asia. However, as Russian Eurasianist rhetoric formulates its vision of 
“Eurasia” irrespective of state borders and given that the general hierarchical relationship between 
Russia and Central Asia is widely accepted,5 it is suggested that the Russo-Kazakh discourse can be 
understood as an exemplary indicator of this hierarchy.
The essay will evolve through four sections. After developing the theoretical framework, Eur-
asianism’s historical evolution and contemporary narratives in Russia and Kazakhstan will be briefly 
outlined. These then will be analyzed with the main findings summarized in the conclusion.
Theoretical Framework
In order to analyze the Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist discourse in terms of hierarchy dynamics, this 
section seeks to elaborate an appropriate theoretical framework. It does so by linking two conceptions 
within the ES edifice: negotiated hegemony, developed by Filippo Costa Buranelli6 and the gemein-
schaft-gesellschaft distinction, introduced to the ES by Barry Buzan.7
Negotiated Hegemony
Buranelli’s concept of negotiated hegemony builds on the discussion of Great Power Manage-
ment (GPM) within the ES. In his seminal work The Anarchical Society, Hedley Bull defined GPM 
as one of five primary institutions of the international society.8 Great Powers (GP) serve an ordering 
function: to “[simplify] the pattern of international relations” by introducing a hierarchical order to 
different states’ interests.9 Importantly, Bull highlights that the status of a GP is contingent upon the 
recognition as such by other states.10 GPs thus legitimize their unequal role by accepting responsi-
bilities and claiming rights.11 Ian Clark derives his notion of hegemony from Bull’s conception of 
4 See: F.C. Buranelli, “Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of Central Asia,” Geopolitics, Vol. 
23, No. 2, 2017; K. Kaczmarska, “Russia’s Droit de Regard: Pluralist Norms and the Sphere of Influence,” Global Discourse, 
Vol. 5, No. 3, 2015; G. Pourchot, Y.A. Stivachtis, “International Society and Regional Integration in Central Asia,” Journal 
of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 5, 2014. 
5 See: S. Hast, Spheres of Influence in International Relations: History, Theory and Politics, Ashgate, Burlington, 2014, 
p. 14.
6 See: F.C. Buranelli, op. cit.
7 See: B. Buzan, “From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the 
English School,” International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993.
8 See: H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, The Macmillan Press LTD, London, 1977, 
pp. 71-74.
9 See: Ibid., p. 206.
10 See: Ibid., p. 202.
11 See: B. Buzan, S. Cui, “Great Power Management in International Society,” The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2016, p. 182.
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GPM, contending that hegemony takes the role of GPM if one single power is prevalent.12 Acknowl-
edging the importance of legitimacy for a hegemon to realize its managerial rights and duties, Clark 
delineates hegemony as an institution of international society from mere material primacy.13 Similar 
to GPs, who are in permanent need “of securing and preserving the consent of other states to their 
special role,”14 a hegemon’s status is therefore better described as a social relationship that is “per-
manently conditional, and subject to ongoing contestation in terms of its degree of legitimacy.”15 
Focusing on spheres of influence, Buranelli traces how the character of this legitimacy changed 
throughout history.16 While historically spheres of influence were above all contingent upon external 
legitimacy—i.e. acceptance by other GPs—the entrenchment of the norm of sovereign equality in the 
contemporary international society increased demand for internal legitimacy. Respectively, these 
normative changes delegitimized power-relations defined as suzerainty or dominion on Adam Wat-
son’s17 spectrum and required GPs to consider the approval of those within their sphere of influence.18 
Pointing to the example of Russia’s relationship with Central Asia, Buranelli argues that contempo-
rary spheres of influence can thus be described as “negotiated hegemony.” The first part of the term 
thereby underlines the influenced states’ competence to “[accept], [accommodate] and even [resist] 
different conditions posed by the hegemon.”19 Discourses thereby constitute “rhetorical indicators” 
of these reactions.20
The Gemeinschaft-gesellschaft Distinction
Buzan21 has introduced the sociological gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction to the ES to 
bridge the different approaches to international society by Hedley Bull and Martin Wight and thereby 
to clear up the complex system/society relationship within the ES framework.22
Buzan identifies Wight’s vision of international society, based on his 1977 Systems of States, to 
correspond to a gemeinschaft conceptualization of society—“something organic and traditional, in-
volving bonds of common sentiment, experience, and identity”.23 According to this civilizational 
gemeinschaft understanding, “some degree of cultural unity”24 is necessary for a society to emerge.25 
It thus assumes that society is based upon an existing culturally homogeneous world society, i.e. com-
mon norms and values.26 Bull, in contrast, leans towards an understanding of international society as 
12 See: I. Clark, “Towards an English School Theory of Hegemony,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 15, 
No. 2, 2009, p. 213.
13 See: Ibidem.
14 H. Bull, op. cit., p. 228.
15 I. Clark, op. cit., p. 223.
16 See: F.C. Buranelli, op. cit.
17 See: A. Watson, The Evolution of international society, Routledge, London, 1992.
18 See: F.C. Buranelli, op. cit., pp. 7-8.
19 Ibid., p. 8.
20 See: Ibid., p. 9.
21 See: B. Buzan, op. cit.
22 See: J. O’Hagan, “The Question of Culture,” in: International Society and its Critics, ed. by A.J. Bellamy, Oxford 
Scholarship Online, 2015, pp. 209-228.
23 B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 333.
24 M. Wight, Systems of States, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1977, p. 33.
25 B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 333.
26 See: R. Little, “International System, International Society and World Society: A Re-evaluation of the English 
School,” in: International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory, ed. by B.A. Roberson, Pinter, 
London, 1998, p. 64.
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an evolutionary interim stage between anarchy and world society.27 This, according to Buzan, follows 
a gesellschaft understanding which “sees society as being contractual and constructed rather than 
sentimental and traditional.”28 Following this functional gesellschaft conception, the existence of a 
shared culture or identity is not necessary. An international society could thus evolve from an inter-
national system without building on a common culture or identity.29 Buzan, however, reasons that a 
consciousness of common values emerges as a product of what Watson calls raison de système, i.e. 
shared objectives among units with “a common desire for order [as the] minimum necessary 
condition.”30 Ultimately, the development of common norms, rules, and institutions leads to the emer-
gence of a common identity whereby sovereign equality constitutes the benchmark that demarcates 
an international society—in which units mutually recognize each other as equal—from an interna-
tional system.31 In a gesellschaft society, sovereign equality is thus seen as vehicle of common iden-
tity.32 Buzan contends that in a postcolonial world, international society is inevitably a multicultural 
one and thus exhibits strong gesellschaft features.33 However, because nearby states often share cul-
tural elements, regional gemeinschaft-type societies can exist within the international society.34
Bringing Both Dimensions Together
In their study on regional integration in the post-Soviet space, Georgeta Pourchot and Yannis 
Stivachtis present the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction and the degree of hierarchy in a regional 
international society as two variables that can be depicted on two independent spectra.35 Also, reason-
ing about the relationship between these two dimensions, Richard Little36 refers to Watson’s discus-
sion of legitimacy and beliefs in ancient imperial systems.37 It suggests that common beliefs and 
norms in historical gemeinschaft-type societies facilitated the generation of legitimacy for authority38 
as (influenced) beliefs of how things are or should be justify restraints on actors.39 Listing several 
counterexamples, Little convincingly qualifies this conclusion, without, however, rebutting its under-
lying reasoning.40
Similarly, I argue here that the two dimensions—type of society and hierarchy—are interre-
lated. Moreover, the argument goes that this interrelation is even more instructive for the contempo-
rary international society, as the internal legitimacy of a hegemonic status has grown more important 
with the entrenchment of the norm of sovereign equality. Following Buranelli’s contention that influ-
ence can be wielded in all three domains of international system (provision of security), interna-
tional society (normative influence), and world society (cultural/civilizational cohesion),41 it is argued 
27 See: B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 334, 338.
28 Ibid., p. 333.
29 See: G. Pourchot, Y.A. Stivachtis, op. cit., p. 71.
30 B. Buzan, op. cit., pp. 334-335.
31 See: Ibid., pp. 336-345.
32 See: S.C. Pasic, “Culturing International Relations Theory: A Call for Extension,” in: The Return of Culture and 
Identity in IR, ed. by Y. Lapid, F. Kratochwil, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, 1996, p. 92.
33 See: B. Buzan, op. cit., p. 336.
34 See: G. Pourchot, Y.A. Stivachtis, op. cit., p. 71; Y.A. Stivachtis, op. cit., p. 70.
35 See: G. Pourchot, Y.A. Stivachtis, op. cit.
36 See: R. Little, “The English School and World History,” in: International Society and its Critics, pp. 45-64.
37 See: A. Watson, op. cit., p. 130.
38 See: R. Little, “The English School and World History,” p. 53.
39 See: A. Watson, op. cit., p. 130.
40 See: R. Little, “The English School and World History,” p. 53.
41 See: F.C. Buranelli, op. cit., p. 9.
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that a hegemon relying on cultural or civilizational discourses has more leverage if the society exhib-
its a strong gemeinschaft character in comparison to one based on a gesellschaft logic. Given that a 
gemeinschaft society has a profounder civilizational grounding with “‘sentimental and traditional’ 
ties between individuals,”42 civilizational and cultural forms of influence must be regarded as more 
potent than in a gesellschaft society that derives its common identity “more shallowly” from the ac-
knowledgement of sovereign equality.
Eurasianism in Russia and Kazakhstan
Eurasianism has recently become a “catchall vision of Russia,”43 an “umbrella term”44 that en-
compasses a myriad of different schools of thought, ideologies, identities and doctrines.45 A disam-
biguation is thus required to clarify the focus of this essay. The following section will briefly outline 
the origins of Eurasianism before depicting the respective Russian and Kazakh Eurasianist narratives 
that serve as case study in this essay.
The roots of Eurasianism trace back to a 19th century anti-European sentiment.46 In the 1920s 
interwar period, Russian exile intellectuals including Nikolay Trubetskoi and Petr Savitsky developed 
an Eurasian ideological movement united by an emphasis on Orthodox faith, the importance of Rus-
sia’s Asian connections, a critique of Eurocentrism, and a specific historical and cultural interpreta-
tion that substantially relocated Russia’s past from the Kievan Rus’ to the steppe.47 Lev Gumilev’s 
influential work, which developed Eurasian thoughts during the Soviet Union before the 1990s, gave 
rise to a multifarious neo-Eurasianism, associated with figures such as Alexander Dugin and politi-
cians like Vladimir Zhirinovsky or Gennady Zyuganov.48
The term “Eurasia” has become widely spread within and outside Russia today. The links of 
contemporary narratives to classical Eurasianism remain questionable, however. Marlène Laruelle 
claims that “[the] more ‘Eurasia’ invades Russia’s public space, popular culture, and state-produced 
narratives in Russia, the more forgetful of its Eurasianist founding ideologists it seems to be.”49 More-
over, the influence of Eurasianist ideology on contemporary foreign policy is debated. While the 
impact of Gumilev’s works on the collective conscience50 and Dugin’s personal ties to political elites 
are highlighted,51 Eurasianist rhetoric in the foreign policy discourse is predominantly deemed prag-
42 R. Little, “The English School and World History,” p. 50.
43 M. Laruelle, op. cit., p. 1.
44 P.J. Katzenstein, N. Weygandt, “Mapping Eurasia in an Open World: How the Insularity of Russia’s Geopolitical and 
Civilizational Approaches Limits Its Foreign Policies,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2017, p. 428.
45 See: M. Laruelle, “Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps,” Ponars Eurasia 
Policy Memo, No. 366, 2015, p. 2.
46 See: F.C. Buranelli, “Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of Interna-
tional Society,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2014; M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An 
Ideology of Empire, p. 18; P. Pryce, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
47 See: M. Laruelle, “Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps,” p. 3; M. Bassin, 
S. Glebov, M. Laruelle, “Introduction: What Was Eurasianism And Who Made It?” in: Between Europe & Asia: The Origins, 
Theories, and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism, ed. by M. Bassin, S. Glebov, M. Laruelle, University of Pittsburgh Press, 
Pittsburgh, 2015, pp. 1-12.
48 See: P.J. Katzenstein, N. Weygandt, op. cit., p. 430; M. Laruelle, “Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Termino-
logical Gaps and Overlaps,” p. 2.
49 M. Laruelle, “Eurasia, Eurasianism, Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps,” p. 5.
50 See: P.J. Katzenstein, N. Weygandt, op. cit.; M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, p. 10.
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matic, i.e. detached from ideology and rather interest-based.52 Regardless of its (non-) ideological 
motivation, this discourse, however, has established a “narrative space for tangential invocations of 
Eurasianist perspectives”53 and thus lends itself for analysis of the underlying visions conveyed.
In Russian foreign policy rhetoric, early Eurasianist references were rather pragmatic in 
character:54 a realization of Russia’s “physical identity” of bordering both European and Asian land-
masses.55 This discourse justified a balanced foreign policy, allowing Russia to pursue its interest both 
in the West and in the East. Vladimir Putin’s 2004 statement on a summit of the Asian-Pacific Eco-
nomic Consortium “Russia always felt itself an [sic!] Eurasian country”56 has to be viewed in this re-
gard, motivated largely by economic gains from making Russia an “energy and transportation bridge 
between Asia and Europe.”57 More recently, however, Russian official Eurasianist rhetoric increas-
ingly takes on a rather civilizational character.58 Putin’s 2011 Izvestia article “A New Integration 
Project for Eurasia”59 that preluded the Eurasian Union project is seen as seminal for this new course.60 
Here, Putin argued not only with economic benefits but conjured “a deeper Eurasian integration which 
reflects in part the civilizational identity of the nations … in a historical Eurasian space.”61 Putin en-
trenched this narrative in his 2013 address to the Valdai Discussion Club, calling the Eurasian Union 
“a project for maintaining the identity of nations in the historical Eurasian space.”62 Within this civili-
zational reasoning, Russia is presented as the leading power within its Eurasian sphere of influence.63
Kazakh Eurasianist foreign policy rhetoric is closely associated with President Nursultan Naz-
arbayev.64 Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism has been identified as pragmatic with significant differences 
from its Russian counterpart.65 The three elements of sovereignty, integration, and leadership are at 
the core of Kazakh Eurasianism.66 It welcomes economic cooperation but emphasizes equality and 
anti-imperialism. Nazarbayev’s 1994 speech, proposing a Union of Eurasian States, is seen as a foun-
dational moment of Kazakh Eurasianism.67 Here, Nazarbayev adopted a counter-hegemonic rhetoric, 
52 See: L. Anceschi, “Kazakhstani Neo-Eurasianism and Nazarbayev’s Anti-Imperial Foreign Policy,” in: The Politics 
of Eurasianism: Identity, Popular Culture and Russia’s Foreign Policy, ed. by M. Bassin, G. Pozo, Rowman & Littlefield 
International, London, 2017, pp. 283-300; M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, pp. 8-9; G. Pozo, “Eur-
asianism in Russian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union,” in: The Politics of Eurasianism: Identity, 
Popular Culture and Russia’s Foreign Policy, pp. 161-180.
53 G. Pozo, op. cit., p. 163.
54 See: M. Schmidt, op. cit.
55 P. Rangsimaporn, “Interpretations of Eurasianism: Justifying Russia’s Role in East Asia,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 58, 
No. 3, 2006, p. 375.
56 Quoted from: M. Schmidt, op. cit., pp. 92-93.
57 P. Rangsimaporn, op. cit., p. 379.
58 See: P.J. Katzenstein, N. Weygandt, op. cit., p. 431.
59 V. Putin, “A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making,” Izvestia, 4 October, 2011, available at 
[https://www.rusemb.org.uk/press/246], 28 September, 2018.
60 See: L. Anceschi, op. cit.; V. Papava, “The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of ‘Central 
Caucaso-Asia,’” Russian Politics and Law, Vol. 51, No. 6, 2014; A. Podberezkin, O. Podberezkina, “Eurasianism as an Idea, 
Civilizational Concept and Integration Challenge,” in: Eurasian Integration—The View from Within, ed. by P. Dutkiewicz, 
R. Sakwa, Routledge, London, 2015, pp. 46-60; G. Pozo, op. cit.
61 G. Pozo, op. cit., p. 167.
62 V. Putin, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” 19 September, 2013, available at [http://en.kremlin.
ru/events/president/news/19243], 28 September, 2018.
63 See: P.J. Katzenstein, N. Weygandt, op. cit., p. 431.
64 See: M. Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, p. 176.
65 See: L. Anceschi, op. cit.; S.N. Cummings, “Eurasian Bridge or Murky Waters between East and West? Ideas, Iden-
tity and Output in Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy,” Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2003.
66 See: Ibid., p. 295.
67 See: L. Anceschi, “Regime-building, Identity-making and Foreign Policy: Neo-Eurasianist Rhetoric in Post-Soviet 
Kazakhstan,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 42, No. 5, 2014, p. 733; D.T. Kudaibergenova, “Eurasian Economic Union Integration 
in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan,” European Politics and Society, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2016, p. 101.
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highlighting the equality of partners, while envisioning a Russo-Kazakh axis as a basis for Eurasian 
multilateral integration.68 Kazakhstan’s relations with Russia are central for this Eurasianist rhetoric69 
as close ties with Russia—as a partner, not a leader—are perceived necessary to secure economic 
benefits.70 Kazakh counter-hegemonic Eurasianist rhetoric proposes a reassessment of Soviet center-
periphery relations, positing Kazakhstan as a leading integrator among equal states.71 The intensity 
of the anti-imperialist narrative varied considerably over time. Introduced in the early 1990s, it weak-
ened when during Putin’s first tenure and the enlargement of the Eurasian Economic Community both 
presidents’ pragmatic Eurasianist rhetoric coincided. Emphasis on sovereignty and equality resur-
faced, however, when Putin adopted more civilizational tones in 2011 and especially after the Crimea 
Crisis in 2014.72
Negotiating Hegemony 
 through Eurasianist Discourse
This section will first examine the Eurasianist discourse as a “rhetorical indicator”73 of the 
Russia-Central Asia negotiated hegemony. Then, the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft dimension will be 
added in order to explain more profoundly how the Eurasianist discourse serves the negotiation of 
this hegemony.
While Kazakhstan in the early 1990s assertively conveyed an anti-imperial rhetoric that sought 
to reassess former center-periphery relations, this counter-hegemonic stance towards Russia silenced 
when Kazakh pragmatic integration plans matched with Russian pragmatic Eurasianist narratives 
before Putin’s third term. After Putin’s return, however, tensions arose between Kazakh Eurasianist 
rhetoric and “Russia’s hegemonic multilateralism.”74 Especially instructive in that regard is the debate 
between Putin and Nazarbayev following the former’s civilizationally colored 2011 Izvestia article. 
Anceschi states that “Putin’s neo-Eurasianism … has hence come to pose specific challenges to the 
[integrationist] leadership agenda pursued by [Kazakhstan] in post-Soviet Eurasia.”75 Less than a 
month later, in response to Putin’s self-presentation as “leader of post-Soviet multilateralism,”76 Naz-
arbayev thus wrote himself a commentary for Izvestia where he illustrated his view on the future of 
Eurasian integration, highlighting the sovereign equality of all states involved in this process.77 More-
over, in December 2013, Nazarbayev urged the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council of the newly 
established Eurasian Economic Union not “to politicize the union we are creating” and presented 
political cooperation as incompatible with the intended economic orientation of the project: “As 
sovereign states, we are actively cooperating … without impinging on each other’s interests.”78 An-
ceschi acknowledges that the development of Kazakh Eurasianist rhetoric has been contingent upon 
68 See: L. Anceschi, “Kazakhstani Neo-Eurasianism and Nazarbayev’s Anti-Imperial Foreign Policy,” p. 288.
69 See: Ibid., p. 285.
70 See: S.N. Cummings, op. cit., p. 141.
71 See: L. Anceschi, “Kazakhstani Neo-Eurasianism and Nazarbayev’s Anti-Imperial Foreign Policy,” pp. 285-287.
72 See: Ibidem; A. Podberezkin, O. Podberezkina, op. cit.
73 F.C. Buranelli, “Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of Central Asia,” p. 9.
74 L. Anceschi, “Kazakhstani Neo-Eurasianism and Nazarbayev’s Anti-Imperial Foreign Policy,” p. 285.
75 Ibid., p. 292.
76 Ibid., p. 285.
77 See: N. Nazarbayev, “Evraziiskii Soiuz: ot idei k istorii budushchego,” Izvestia, 25 October, 2011, available at: 
[https://iz.ru/news/504908], 28 September, 2018.
78 N. Nazarbayev as translated in A. Podberezkin, O. Podberezkina, op. cit., p. 52.
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its environment.79 Viewed in the framework of negotiated hegemony, Kazakhstan’s counter-hege-
monic rhetoric thus needs to be understood as resistance to the hegemonic aspirations that are inher-
ent in Russia’s civilizational Eurasianism since 2011.
Trying to locate both nations’ formulated Eurasian visions on the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft 
spectrum reveals a stark contrast. By highlighting civilizational and cultural ties, a shared history and 
identity, Putin invokes an ideal close to the gemeinschaft-type society. Kazakhstan’s vision of Eur-
asia, on the other hand, seeks to restrict Eurasian integration to rather pragmatic, predominantly 
economic cooperation and puts to the front sovereignty and equality of states. The Kazakh ideal thus 
leans towards a gesellschaft-type society that is based on functional interaction instead of a common 
culture or identity. This difference can be explained through both countries’ positions within the 
negotiated hegemony relationship. Given that a hegemon can wield influence through all three differ-
ent domains, including cultural or civilizational affinity,80 and given that common beliefs can be used 
to generate legitimacy for authority,81 a gemeinschaft ideal of Eurasia enables Russia to assert its 
claim for regional hegemony more effectively. Ray Silvius writes that “[civilizational narratives 
demonstrate] the co-opting by the Russian state of what are otherwise more potentially radical and 
disruptive strains of Eurasianism for the purpose of establishing ideological hegemony and legiti-
macy.” This is done by portraying Russia as “the architect of a Russia-centered regional order on 
Eurasian space.”82 Peter Katzenstein and Nicole Weygandt moreover highlight that on the civiliza-
tional level “[culture], mass media, common language, the Orthodox Church, and business networks 
all provide instruments of influence.”83 Kazakhstan’s emphatic insistence on a gesellschaft model for 
Eurasia in turn reflects the country’s weaker position on the hierarchy spectrum. Highlighting the 
equality of all states taking part in Eurasian integration and stressing their sovereignty constitutes a 
refusal of Russia’s supposedly civilizationally legitimized hegemony. Rejecting the “politicization” 
of integration projects and showing a clear preference for economic cooperation can furthermore be 
seen as an attempt to limit Russian influence in the domain of world society, i.e. through cultural or 
civilizational cohesion.
C o n c l u s i o n
This essay has explored the Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist discourse in terms of hierarchy dynamics 
in Russia’s relationship with Central Asia. After having established a theoretical framework building 
on Buranelli’s concept of negotiated hegemony and Buzan’s gemeinschaft-gesellschaft distinction, 
the origins of Eurasianism as well as contemporary Eurasianist narratives in Russian and Kazakh 
foreign policy discourse were depicted. The analysis examined the Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist dis-
course as an indicator of a negotiated hegemony relationship between Russia and Central Asia. The 
negotiation within this relationship is characterized by a Russian invocation of a civilizational ge-
meinschaft-type society built on a common culture and identity, serving the legitimation of Russian 
hegemonic claims. The functional gesellschaft vision which Kazakhstan conveys through its prag-
matic Eurasianist rhetoric constitutes in turn a resistance to these hegemonic claims by highlighting 
sovereign equality and invoking counter-hegemonic narratives.
79 See: L. Anceschi, “Kazakhstani Neo-Eurasianism and Nazarbayev’s Anti-Imperial Foreign Policy,” pp. 294-295.
80 See: F.C. Buranelli, “Spheres of Influence as Negotiated Hegemony—The Case of Central Asia.” 
81 See: R. Little, “The English School and World History.”
82 R. Silvius, “Eurasianism and Putin’s Embedded Civilizationalism,” in: The Eurasian Project and Europe: Regional 
Discontinuities and Geopolitics, ed. by D. Lane, V. Samokhvalov, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2015, p. 76.
83 P.J. Katzenstein, N. Weygandt, op. cit., p. 431.
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More generally speaking, the analysis thus suggests that the type of society preferred or pro-
moted by an actor is interrelated with this actor’s stance within a negotiated hegemony relationship. 
According to this reasoning, a(n aspirational) hegemon will promote a gemeinschaft-type society 
because this civilizational ideal offers a greater leverage to generate legitimacy as well as to wield 
influence over other actors of the society. Promoting a gesellschaft-type society in turn may deprive 
the hegemon of this leverage, thus opposing hegemonic aspirations or extorting better conditions 
within the negotiated hegemony.
This interrelation between the two dimensions of society-type and hierarchy requires further 
theoretical reasoning and different case studies. However, it has proven insightful for the analysis of 
the Russo-Kazakh Eurasianist discourse as it offers an explanation for both countries’ differing Eur-
asianist narratives.
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